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T HE AVIATION automatic pilot (autopilot) developed
from a prototype gyroscopic wing leveler first installed in
an airplane in 1909.1 Sperry Gyroscope Company improved
this primitive system into a two-axis autopilot that was used
in World War I. By 1933, Sperry installed a three-axis
autopilot into a Lockheed Vega named Winnie Mae, in which
Wiley Post made a solo, around-the-world flight. Sperry im-
proved this three-axis autopilot into the A-3 automatic pilot,
which was used in the Boeing 247 and Douglas DC-3 trans-
ports. Sperry and Honeywell further developed the autopilot
during World War II. The first reported case involving avia-
tion autopilot litigation in the United States was Trihey v.
Transocean Air Lines, Inc.' In this action, brought under the
* This paper was originally presented at the Seventeenth Annual SMU Air Law
Symposium, sponsored by the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, School of Law,
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, March 3-5, 1983.
** Member, Happy, Cooling & Herbers, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri; J.D., Notre
Dame Law School; B.A., University of Missouri (Columbia).
*** Member, Happy, Cooling & Herbers, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri; J.D., Univer-
sity of Missouri Law School (Columbia); M.B.A., University of Missouri; B.S.L., Ge-
orgetown University.
, Letter from E. Sperry, AOPA PILOT, April 1983, at 11-12; LaCagnina, The Legacy
of Mechanical Mike, AOPA PILor, Jan. 1983, at 37.
2 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958). Litigation involving
autopilots has been part of marine litigation since the development of the first auto-
matic steering device. An entire body of law dealing with autopilot accidents in
marine vessels now exists. See, e.g, Green v. Crow, 243 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1957); Peti-
tion of H. & H. Wheel Ser., 219 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1955); Daniels v. Trawler Sea-
Rambler, 294 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1965).
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Death on the High Seas Act,' the plaintiffs alleged that faulty
maintenance of the autopilot was the cause of the loss of an
aircraft in the Pacific Ocean near Wake Island in 1953."
During the next twenty years, airline travel became an ac-
cepted way of life in the United States, and as aircraft design
safety improved, so did the navigation instruments and
autopilot systems installed in the aircraft. It therefore was a
shock to the aviation industry when a Lockheed 1011 jetliner
was lost in the Florida Everglades because altitude-hold mode
on the autopilot had disengaged while the flight crew was di-
verted by a landing gear problem.8 As a result of this accident,
improved warning devices for pilots were developed regarding
the engagement, disengagement, and mode of operation of the
autopilot and flight director systems.'
The 1980's have brought tremendous developments in
microprocessors and digital technology which have been ap-
plied to flight control systems for both airline and general avi-
ation aircraft. As a result, recent autopilot litigation has be-
come "high-tech." The purpose of this article is to provide a
basic understanding of the operation of a general aviation
autopilot, to review the reported cases involving autopilots,
and to suggest some of the issues to be decided in future
autopilot litigation.
II. JURY PERCEPTION OF AUTOPILOTS
Most jurors have no aviation experience. When they learn
that they have been selected to decide a case involving an air-
craft autopilot, their past experience may be of little benefit
in helping them understand the significance of the testimony
they will hear. Most of them are familiar with the cruise con-
trol of an automobile, but many probably envision an
46 U.S.C. § § 761-768 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
255 F.2d at 827. The trial court's holding for the plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.
The trial court did not invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Id.
8 See Gellert v. Eastern Air Lines, 370 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
See Garrison, Integrated Flight-Control Systems, Automatic Navigation Sys-
tems and Frequency Management Systems, AvioNics NEWS, Sept. 1982, at 24; Ad-
dress by Taylor, New Developments in Avionics, Fourteenth Annual SMU Air Law
Symposium, Dallas, Texas (March 6-8, 1980).
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autopilot as it was presented in the movie Airplane; that is, as
an inflatable, cigar-smoking dummy that can be called upon
in a moment of crisis to fly the airplane when the pilot and
co-pilot have been overcome by food poisoning.
During the early part of a trial, the plaintiff's attorney will
emphasize the control over an airplane that an autopilot ex-
erts. He may attempt to persuade the jury that an autopilot is
like a robot that sits in the co-pilot's seat and pushes and
pulls on the controls of the aircraft with great authority. He
may ask the jury to imagine that there is a curtain separating
the pilot and the robot, so that the pilot cannot see what ma-
neuver the robot autopilot will next execute.
The defense attorney, of course, emphasizes the pilot's con-
trol over and responsibility for the autopilot. He explains to
the jury that the autopilot assists the pilot if necessary but
that the pilot is at all times in command of the aircraft. The
pilot can disengage or overpower the autopilot at any time
and the autopilot is designed to operate as a very weak pilot.
If there is any malfunction of the autopilot, the pilot is pro-
vided visual and aural warnings, and he can easily disengage
the autopilot and continue the flight of the aircraft just as if it
had not been equipped with an autopilot. In some cases, the
attorney may need to distinguish the functions of an autopilot
from those of an entire flight control system.
During the course of the trial, counsel will need to teach the
jury the general theories of autopilot operation. In order to
prevent the jury from becoming confused by the electronic
and mechanical details of the autopilot, an attorney should
use numerous simplified visual aids and should call expert
witnesses who can explain the principles of autopilots and
give the jury an understanding of how an autopilot works in
the air. A Glossary of Terms has been provided as an appen-
dix to this article to aid in explanation to the jury of aviation
and autopilot terminology."
' For further explanation of aviation terms, see In re Aircrash Disaster at Boston,
Mass., July 31, 1973, 412 F. Supp. 959 (D. Mass. 1976); J. FoYE & D. CRANE, AIRCArr
TECHNICAL DICTIONARY (1978).
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III. THE FUNCTIONING OF AN AUTOPILOT
The first step in understanding how an autopilot works is
understanding how an airplane flies. The Pilot's Handbook of
Aeronautic Knowledge, prepared by the Federal Aviation Ad-
mistration (FAA), reviews common aeronautical terms such as
lift, thrust, drag, airfoils, climb, descent, turn, pitch, roll, yaw,
and explains the cockpit controls and aircraft control surfaces
that determine flight.8 Diagram "A" illustrates the compo-
nents of a typical autopilot system installed in a general avia-
tion aircraft.
The general aviation autopilot is designed to assist the pilot
in flying the airplane by maintaining the aircraft heading and
altitude and by relieving the pilot of the need to make contin-
ual small corrections for atmospheric disturbances, such as
gusts or winds. Autopilots usually have additional capabilities,
such as automatic navigation and automatic tracking. The
autopilot flies like the pilot by sensing the pitch, roll, heading,
and altitude information from the basic flight instruments
and then feeding that information into the autopilot com-
puter. The autopilot computer gives a signal to and actuates
an electric motor (servo) that in turn moves cables attached to
the aircraft control surfaces (rudder, aileron, elevator, or one
of the trim tabs on those surfaces) to give the desired flight
path. In addition to the basic heading and altitude-hold func-
tion, general aviation autopilots typically have full navigation
and tracking capabilities, including full VOR, localizer and
glide slope coupling. Other modes may include go around,
back course, control wheel steering, and altitude pre-select.
Autopilots are capable of performing in all three axes (pitch,
roll, and yaw). Complete flight control systems including a
flight director, are also available for general aviation aircraft. 9
Diagram "B" illustrates the pitch control system, which is
central to the operation of an autopilot on a typical 2-axis
autopilot. This example is an electrically driven system that
6 FAA, PILOT'S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, 1-34 (1980). See the Ap-
pendix for an explanation of any unfamiliar terms.
' Garrison, Integrated Flight-Control Systems, Automated Navigation Systems
and Frequency-Management Systems, AvioNIcs NEWS (Sept. 1982), at 24.
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operates both the elevator and elevator trim tab. Diagram "C"
shows how a typical servo attachment to the elevator operates
by the use of a clutch to make the necessary adjustments to
the elevator. Upon a command from the autopilot computer,
the servo attachment pitches the nose of the airplane up or
down along the pitch axis.
A. Primary Pitch Control
The primary pitch control function of the autopilot regu-
lates the position of the elevator. If, for example, the pilot
commands the autopilot to climb, the autopilot computer will
send a signal to the elevator servo, commanding the servo mo-
tor to run in the "elevator-up" direction. This servo must
have sufficient strength or authority to perform the desired
maneuver, should not have so much strength or authority that
it would ever constitute a problem for flight safety. Therefore,
a "slip clutch" arrangement limits the amount of torque that
can be transmitted from the servo to the elevator itself. The
servo motor is connected to a set of cables through this clutch
arrangement, and the cables are connected to the control sur-
face. If the servo motor, for any reason, attempts to deflect
the control surface faster or with more strength or authority
for which it is designed, the clutch will slip, and prevent an
overactive servo from transmitting more "pull" to the control
surface than is desirable.
One type of malfunction associated with the primary pitch
servo is a "hard-over," which results in a maximum pitch-up
or pitch-down response in the servo. As will be explained
later, the autopilot system must be designed so that the maxi-
mum hard-over signal through the servo will not constitute a
flight safety problem. In fact, there is "smoothing" circuitry in
the autopilot computer, which directs the elevator servo to
move the elevator at a gradual, controlled rate, providing a
smooth and comfortable flight, and a safety factor against the
"hard-over" occurrence.
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B. Automatic Pitch Trim
A second servo operates the elevator trim tab, to relieve the
load on the elevator servo. For example, the pilot may com-
mand a climb that will last for several minutes. Rather than
having the elevator servo hold the elevator out of trim for the
duration of the climb, the flight computer, after a short delay,
will activate the pitch trim servo, which will run the elevator
trim to relieve the load on the elevator, and the load on the
elevator servo.
This "autotrim" function of the autopilot also incorporates
a slip clutch. However, the major safety feature in the auto-
trim function is provided by a control on the rate at which the
trim tab is moved. Generally, the autotrim function moves the
trim tab at a very slow rate, much slower than the pilot could
manually introduce trim, and usually slower than the manual
electric trim, discussed below.
Several problems can occur in the trim function, including
the trim running without an appropriate command (some-
times referred to as "trim run-away"), the trim failing to run
upon command, or the trim running in the wrong direction.
When a pilot observes one of these undesirable responses oc-
curring, he may be incorrect in assuming that the autopilot is
at fault. The autopilot is only part of an integrated system,
which relies upon the power supply, other instruments provid-
ing information, and the attachments between the servos and
the control surface or trim tabs. A failure of the airplane to
respond to a given command by the pilot therefore can be the
result of a problem existing outside of the autopilot itself.
A time delay is designed into the system so that the auto-
trim does not operate automatically every time the elevator is
deflected for minor corrections. If the elevator servo is to de-
flect the elevator for only a short period of time (a matter of a
few seconds), the trim will not operate. If the elevator deflec-
tion is to continue for more than a few seconds, the trim will
be activated to assist the elevator servo after a short delay.
In some systems, it is possible that a run-away trim condi-
tion will be opposed by the autopilot through the elevator
servo so that the pilot will not observe the defect. For exam-
1983]
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ple, if there is a trim run-away in the "nose-up" position, the
computer may command the elevator servo to run in the nose-
down direction, to counteract the effect of the trim. The ele-
vator servo will be able to hold the elevator in its deflected
position, effectively masking the trim problem (assuming that
the pilot has not observed any visual or aural warnings of a
trim malfunction), until the autotrim condition causes the
forces on the elevator to exceed the setting of the elevator
servo's slip clutch. At that point, the clutch will begin to slip,
the autopilot will gradually lose its ability to mask the auto-
trim run-away situation, and the aircraft will begin to deviate
from its commanded attitude.
If at some point the autopilot is suddenly disengaged by the
pilot in an out-of-trim position, all direct control of the eleva-
tor will be released and the aircraft may enter into a sudden
pitch up or down. Likewise, if the human pilot overpowers the
autopilot in some systems without disengaging, his pushing or
pulling on the control column will be sensed by the computer,
which will attempt to maintain the attitude originally com-
manded in opposition to the efforts of the pilot. In this way,
the pilot can actually induce the autopilot to place the aircraft
in an out-of-trim position. If the pilot then suddenly releases
the control column or disengages the autopilot without antici-
pating this out-of-trim position, he may experience a similar
pitch response.
C. Manual Electric Trim
An aircraft may be equipped with a manual electric trim
system that allows the pilot to operate a switch on the control
panel which engages the pitch trim servo and moves the pitch
trim tab. The manual electric trim is designed to assist the
pilot during takeoff and landing and for his convenience en-
route. This system is not a part of the autopilot and will oper-
ate the elevator trim tab at a rate faster than that of the auto-
trim function in the autopilot.
D. Roll Axis
An autopilot system also has roll control through servos
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connected to the aileron cables and aileron trim, but a sepa-
rate explanation is not included here because the theory of
operation of the roll axis is the same as for the pitch axis.
E. Disengagement of the Automatic Pilot
Any time the pilot desires, the autopilot may be completely
disengaged by the use of the red disconnect button on the
control wheel, the on/off switch on the mode controller, the
avionics power switch, or (in some systems) the manual elec-
tric trim switch. The autopilot can also be disengaged by pull-
ing the autopilot's electric circuit breaker. Additionally, the
system may be overpowered by the pilot if necessary.
F. Summary
The pilot selects the autopilot function through the mode
controller. The autopilot computer obtains further informa-
tion from sensors (gyroscopes, altitude deviation and naviga-
tion radios). The commands are carried out by actuators (ser-
vos) that affect the aircraft control surfaces.' 0
IV. CERTIFICATION OF AUTOPILOTS BY THE FAA
The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) require that all
aircraft manufacturers obtain a Type Certificate from the
FAA which is issued upon a showing that the design of the
specific aircraft meets the detailed standards for operation, air
safety, material, and performance." Generally, all manufac-
turers of autopilot systems obtain a Supplemental Type Cer-
tificate (S.T.C.) from the FAA in order to allow the installa-
tion of their autopilot system in any particular aircraft.'" An
Is For an excellent explanation of the general aviation autopilot, see J. Roskam &
M. See, A Primer on General Aviation Autopilots, 1 SAE IN AEROSPACE ENGINEERING
(Sept. 1981)(based on SAE paper 810582, The State of the Art of General Aviation
Autopilots: Now and in the Future, Univ. of Kansas) (Copies may be obtained from
the Society of Automotive Engineers). For a detailed explanation of any particular
autopilot, see the FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual Supplement for the desired
aircraft as well as the autopilot manufacturer's pilot guide.
" 14 C.F.R. § § 21.21-.41 (1982). See also Carsey, Initial and Continuing Respon-
sibilities of General Aviation Manufacturers, 37 J. AIR L. & CoM. 295 (1971).
Is 14 C.F.R. § § 21.111-.119 (1982).
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S.T.C. is issued for all major design changes to Type Certified
products when the changes are too minor to require a new
Type Production Certificate.13 The S.T.C. gives FAA ap-
proval for the installation of the autopilot for each airplane
model."4
In order to obtain the S.T.C., the autopilot system must
meet the requirements of FAR No. 23.1329, Automatic Pilot
Systems, which sets forth the airworthiness standards for ap-
proval of the installation for general aviation autopilot sys-
tems. 15 FAR 25.1329 correspondingly applies for transport
13 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1982).
" See 14 C.F.R. § 21.119(b) (1982).
' 14 C.F.R. § 23.1329 (1982). This section provides:
If an automatic pilot system is installed, it must meet the following:
(a) Each system must be designed so that the automatic pilot
can -
(1) Be quickly and positively disengaged by the pilots to
prevent it from interfering with their control of the air-
plane; or
(2) Be sufficiently overpowered by one pilot to let him con-
trol the airplane.
(b) Unless there is automatic synchronization, each system
must have a means to readily indicate to the pilot the
alignment of the actuating device in relation to the control
system it operates.
(c) Each manually operated control for the system opera-
tion must be readily accessible to the pilot. Each control
must operate in the same plane and sense of motion aa
specified in § 23.779 for cockpit controls. The direction of
motion must be plainly indicated on or near each control.
(d) Each system must be designed and adjusted so that,
within the range of adjustment available to the pilot, it
cannot produce hazardous loads on the airplane or create
hazardous deviations in the flight path, under any flight
condition appropriate to its use, either during normal oper-
ation or in the event of malfunction, assuming that correc-
tive action begins within a reasonable period of time.
(e) Each system must be designed so that a single malfunc-
tion will not produce a hardover signal in more than one
control axis. If the automatic pilot integrates signals from
auxiliary controls or furnishes signals for operation of other
equipment, positive interlocks and sequencing of engage-
ment to prevent improper operation are required.
(f) There must be protection against adverse interaction of
integrated components, resulting from a malfunction.
(g) If the automatic pilot system can be coupled to
airbourne navigation equipment, means must be provided
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category aircraft.16
An FAA Advisory Circular entitled Automatic Pilot Sys-
tems Approval (non-transport), sets forth acceptable means
by which compliance with the automatic pilot installation re-
quirements of FAR 23.1329 could be shown.17 This Advisory
Circular was cancelled, however, in May of 1977, and has not
been replaced." Presently, general aviation autopilot manu-
facturers are operating under FAA policy letters in order to
set an acceptable means of compliance with FAR 23.1329. A
presently effective advisory circular, entitled Automatic Pilot
Systems Approval,"' applies to transport category aircraft and
contains many standards similar to the Automatic Pilot Sys-
tems Approved (non-transport) Advisory Circular.
In order to obtain the S.T.C., an FAA Engineering Test Pi-
lot, or a pilot approved by the FAA under the FAA's desig-
nated alteration station (D.A.S.) authority, 0 undertakes a cer-
tification flight test to confirm that the autopilot system
meets the FAA certification requirements.2 ' During the flight
test portion of the certification, a Supplemental Type Inspec-
tion Report is filled out that covers all safety related aspects
of the test flight. The FAA also approves the Airplane Flight
Manual Supplement for the autopilot during this portion of
the testing and that Supplement must be attached to the Air-
plane Flight Manual.2"
Almost all general aviation autopilots are manufactured to
meet the standards of FAR 37.119." This section sets the
minimum standards for a technical standard order authoriza-
to indicate to the flight crew the current mode of opera-




17 FAA, ADVISORY CIR. No. 23.1321-1, AUTOMATIC PILOT SYSTEMS APPROVAL (NON-
TRANSPORT) (1965) (cancelled in 1977).
Is Id.
19 FAA, ADVISORY CIR. No. 25.1329-1A, AUTOMATIC PILOT SYSTEMS APPROVAL
(1968).
20 14 C.F.R. § 21.431 (1982).
2- Id. § 21.35.
2 Id. § 21.
's Id. § 37.119.
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tion (T.S.O.) for an automatic pilot. Automatic pilots manu-
factured after September 15, 1960 are required to meet addi-
tional standards. 24
Generally, an autopilot system will not receive FAA certifi-
cation unless the manufacturer can demonstrate that under
normal conditions, in the event of any malfunction, the
autopilot cannot produce hazardous loads on the airplane or
create hazardous deviations in the flight path, if the pilot ini-
tiates corrective action "within a reasonable period of time. '2 5
One of the most basic design decisions for the autopilot man-
ufacturer is to determine how much authority the autopilot
must have to fly the airplane (performance capability) while
still ensuring that any conceivable malfunction of the
autopilot under normal usage will not involve a problem of
flight safety.
In the certification process, the manufacturer must demon-
strate that its system can be quickly and positively disengaged
or easily overpowered by the human pilot without interfering
with control of the aircraft in the event of a malfunction. The
manufacturer must also demonstrate, among many other
things, that no single malfunction can produce a "hard-over"
signal in more than one control axis.'6
In the actual flight testing during the certification proce-
dure, a number of malfunctions will be artificially introduced
in the system to demonstrate compliance with FAR 23.1329.
Under the guidelines set out in the advisory circulars and pol-
icy letters mentioned above,'7 a three second delay between
pilot recognition of the induced autopilot malfunction and ini-
tiation of corrective action is used as the basis for approval.
Generally, in the certification flight test: (1) the artificial mal-
function will be induced into the system; (2) deviation will be-
gin; (3) the pilot will recognize the deviation, either through
the behavior of the aircraft, or a reliable failure warning sys-
24 Id. See SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, SAE AERONAUTICAL STANDARD AS-
402A AUTOMATIC PILOTS (Feb. 1959) (Copies may be obtained from the Society of
Automotive Engineers).
14 C.F.R § 23.1329(d) (1982). See supra note 15.
' Id. § 23.1329(e).
,7 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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tem; (4) the pilot will wait to take any action for a period of
three seconds; and (5) corrective action will be initiated. The
corrective action must not result in dangerous dynamic condi-
tions or deviations from the flight path, nor create loads in
excess of one "G." The three second delay period is reduced
to one second for demonstrated malfunctions on a coupled ap-
proach on the theory that the pilot is more likely to be paying
closer attention to his instruments and the operation of the
autopilot on approach than he would be if he were cruising at
altitude.
Therefore, an autopilot that has received certification must
have demonstrated that no malfunction should cause a flight
safety problem. This may be of significant benefit to autopilot
manufacturers in defending claims for product defect on a
theory of strict liability, particularly in those states which re-
quire the plaintiff to prove not only a defect in the product,
but also that the defect rendered the product "unreasonably
dangerous." 8 Arguably, the purpose and result of certification
of an autopilot system are to demonstrate that no malfunction
of the autopilot can create an unreasonably dangerous situa-
tion for the pilot and substantially hinder adequate proof of
all the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action in strict
liability.
V. TREATMENT OF AUTOPILOT CASES IN THE COURTS
A. Definition
In Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Cherokee Laborato-
ries, Inc.,2 9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, in an action by the insurance company to recover
under an aircraft hull policy, stated that the aircraft "was
equipped and capable of being flown with an automatic pilot,
a device allowing the pilot to be relieved under routine flying
conditions but subject to being overwhelmed by manual con-
'. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
" 288 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1961).
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trol if necessary or desireable."80 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Nevada defined an automatic pilot as "an instrument
which, when activated, will maintain the course and altitude
the pilot selects for the flight of the aircraft."8
B. Negligence
Upon the occurrence of an unexplained crash, passengers in
a resulting suit will attempt to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to shift the burden of proving the cause of the acci-
dent to the defendant airline. Evidence of the defendant air-
line's failure to properly maintain the autopilot would then
become very damaging. This strategy was unsuccessful in
Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 32 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to overturn a trial
court's finding that the defendant airline was not liable for an
unexplained crash in the ocean. 8 In this action, brought
under the Death on the High Seas Act," a passenger airline
crashed in the Pacific without warning. The representatives of
passengers attempted to invoke res ipsa loquitur and intro-
duced evidence that the crash may have resulted from defen-
dant's faulty maintenance of the autopilot."
The trial court found for the defendant airline, but was un-
clear whether res ipsa loquitur had been applied. The court of
appeals affirmed, finding that while res ipsa loquitur could
have been applied by the trial court, it did not mandate a
finding for the plaintiff when the evidence was contradic-
tory. 6 The appellate court did not hold that the trial court's
findings of fact and law were clearly erroneous. 7
The representatives of a deceased passenger proved more
successful in invoking res ipsa loquitur in Nelson v. American
30 Id. at 97-99.
" Lightenburger v. Gordon, 81 Nev. 553, 407 P.2d 728, 733 (1965). See also 2 J.
KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL OF AIR CRASH CASES, ch. 3, at 61 (1968).
3 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958).
13 Id. at 832-33.
- 46 U.S.C. § § 761-68 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
"1 255 F.2d at 827.
N Id. at 826-27.
' Id. at 832.
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Airlines, Inc.3 8 In that case, an aircraft passenger brought suit
against the airline when she was injured when thrown about
the cabin by a sudden and unexpected maneuver of the air-
plane due to a malfunction of the automatic pilot.39 The auto-
matic pilot overcompensated pitch trim, causing the aircraft
to nose down, rather than to stay level, when the altitude-hold
feature of the automatic pilot was engaged. The co-pilot im-
mediately disengaged the automatic pilot and assumed man-
ual control, but some passengers were injured due to the se-
vere movement in the rear of the plane. The amplifier
computer, a component of the autopilot, had been replaced
the day prior to the incident because of trouble with the alti-
tude-hold feature. The trial court rendered judgment for the
airline upon a finding that the passengers' injuries were not
caused by any want of due care on the part of the airline.
The California Appellate Court reversed, however, holding
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur mandated a finding for
the plaintiff unless the defendant airline could demonstrate
that there was some cause of the accident other than defen-
dant's lack of due care or that the accident was caused by an
unknown unpreventable cause. The court found no evidence
in the record that negligence in the installation or mainte-
nance of the equipment did not cause the accident."'
While a pilot is not required to utilize the autopilot on a
landing, his failure to use it may be inconsistent with good
operating procedure and may be evidence of a failure of due
care. In Klein v. United States,42 a Piper crashed on an in-
strument landing after encountering the wake turbulence of a
jet liner that the Piper was following at a distance of three
miles. The plaintiff alleged liability on the part of the air traf-
fic controllers for improper instructions. The court found that
the pilot had not engaged his autopilot on approach, which
automatically would have placed the pilot on approach on the
38 263 Cal. App. 2d 742, 70 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1968).
*9 70 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
'0 Id. at 36.
11 Id. at 36-37. The court rejected the trial court's reliance on a pre-flight check as
negating the inference of negligence. d.
" 13 Av. Cas. 18,137 (D. Md. 1975).
1983]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
centerline of the glide slope and the localizer." This resulted
in the pilot's approaching below the lowest limit of the glide
slope corridor. The court held that the pilot's failure to utilize
the autopilot and his operation of the aircraft below the glide
slope corridor, along with his failure to properly set his altim-
eter, were the proximate cause of the wake turbulence en-
counter and the crash."
A court may also infer negligence on the part of the pilot
from evidence that suggests that the pilot switched from auto-
matic pilot to manual in a crisis situation. In Wells v. United
States,4" the pilot of a Piper Turbo Arrow began a flight on
Visual Flight Rules (VFR). When the pilot encountered bad
weather, an air traffic controller directed him to turn to a
nearer airport. The pilot was forced to fly through clouds with
little visual contact with the ground, relying on his autopilot.
The plane inexplicably entered into a spiral and crashed into
the ground."
The trial court held that the pilot, rather than the air traffic
controller, was responsible for the crash.47 The court con-
cluded that the plane could not have gone into a spiral unless
the pilot disengaged or overrode the autopilot. The court sug-
gested that when an airplane flies into clouds spatial disorien-
tation may result, causing the pilot to misperceive the plane's
attitude." This pilot in particular had also lost control on sev-
eral occasions in the past while flying manually. He was,
therefore, negligent in attempting to fly into clouds without
the use of the autopilot.
The representatives of a pilot of a twin-engine Beechcraft
were similarly unable to establish the liability of air traffic
controllers when the plane crashed on an instrument ap-
proach in Michelmore v. United States.4 9 The pilot, who was
13 Id. at 18,138.
Id. at 18,141.
16 Av. Cas. 17,914 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
Id. at 17,917.
17 Id. at 17,918. A pilot in command is directly and solely responsible for the safe
operation of his aircraft. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1982).
18 16 Av. Cas. at 17,917.
19 299 F. Supp. 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
AUTOPILOT LITIGATION
not rated for instrument flying, began his flight even though
he had received reports of bad weather. The weather forced
the pilot to attempt an emergency instrument landing under
the guidance of the air traffic controllers. The court held that
the plaintiffs had produced insufficient evidence of air traffic
controller negligence to meet their burden of proof." The
court dismissed the plaintiffs' contention that the automatic
pilot had failed or that the pilot had overridden the autopilot
because of spatial disorientation. 1
An application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to a set of
bizarre facts occurred in Merrill v. United Airlines.2 When
an airliner crashed into the Rocky Mountains at 11,570 feet,
the defendant airline presented evidence that the autopilot
was engaged at a certain point along the route and set at an
altitude of 10,000 feet.53 Based upon evidence found at the
crash site that smoke masks had been used, the defendant
suggested that the pilot and co-pilot had become incapaci-
tated, and the airliner had continued to fly with the autopilot
engaged until impact with the mountain. Defendant's expert
contended that the mountain wave effect pushed the airplane
up 1,570 feet to the impact altitude of 11,570 feet, in spite of
the action of the autopilot on altitude-hold. 4 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the defendant airline, which was upheld
on appeal, in spite of a res ipsa loquitur charge.
C. Strict Liability
A suit against the aircraft manufacturer in strict liability in
tort may be possible upon the malfunction of the automatic
pilot or the pitch control system generally, as was illustrated
in Federal Insurance Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp."5 In that
case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict
against an aircraft manufacturer based upon breach of im-
60 Id. at 1125.
11 Id. at 1119-20.
51 25 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
63 Id. at 72-73.
" Id. at 73. Plaintiff's theory of the crash was that the pilots had deviated from
their safer scheduled course to make up lost time. Id.
" No. 78-1444 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 7, 1980).
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plied warranty and strict liability in tort. The plaintiffs had
argued that a defect in the manual electric trim caused the
plane to "pitch up" when the automatic pilot was disengaged.
The defendant manufacturer argued that the plaintiffs had
produced insufficient evidence to demonstrate proximate cau-
sation. The plaintiffs' expert witness testified that wreckage
showed that the plane had been cruising at a high speed with
the autopilot engaged, but that the autopilot disengaged im-
mediately before the crash. The stabilizer trim had been unre-
sponsive to control (in a "runaway" condition), and the fuse-
lage had a compression bend near the tail, which had crippled
the plane and was the immediate cause of the crash." The
expert developed a theory that the autopilot had masked a
defect in the manual electric trim. When the automatic pilot
was disengaged, the stabilizer and trim were abruptly re-
leased, resulting in a severe nose-up motion in the plane. This
caused the compression bend in the fuselage and the subse-
quent crash. The court found sufficient evidence to uphold
this theory of the crash and the jury verdict.57
D. Expert Opinion
In Lightenburger v. Gordon" a light twin engine aircraft
flew into the Los Angeles International Airport under ex-
tremely poor conditions of ceiling and visibility, and the plane
crashed after a missed approach. The aircraft was equipped
with an automatic pilot and approach coupler. An investiga-
tion of the wreckage suggested that the automatic pilot was
off. An expert testified that the pilot may have unwittingly
pressed the disconnect button under his left thumb on the
control wheel and deactivated the autopilot during the ap-
proach." The estate of the passenger filed a wrongful death
suit against the pilot of the aircraft. The jury found for the
defendant pilot, but the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed
Id.
57 Id.
00 81 Nev. 553, 407 P.2d 728 (1965).
" 407 P.2d at 733.
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and remanded on other grounds."
E. Design/Warnings
In Goldsmith v. Martin Marietta Corp.,61 a passenger air-
liner inexplicably crashed into a mountain. The plaintiffs' the-
ory of the case was that an unguarded switch on the naviga-
tional compass was inadvertently and unknowingly activated
by the crew when the plane was in a bank preparing to land,
causing the aircraft to be off course and crash. The caging
switch for a flux gate navigational compass instrument was
mounted in the same location as the automatic pilot pedestal
controller. Plaintiffs suggested that the pilot had changed the
compass while intending to adjust the automatic pilot. Bendix
was sued for designing and manufacturing a flux gate caging
without a guard."
The Bendix manual for the equipment contained two warn-
ings. It warned against the navigational hazards created by in-
correct positioning of the flux gate and further warned that an
incorrect positioning could result from accidental operation.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendant
Bendix, holding that "[t]he design of the caging switch, in
fact, did include a guard .... It did not guard against negli-
gent actuation of the switch; rather, it gave warning of the
occurrence of such negligence. ' '" 3
F. Autopilot as Necessary Equipment
In Air Line Pilot's Assoc., Int'l v. Federal Aviation Admin-
istration" the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that an airline pilot did not have a pro-
tected right to refuse to fly in inclement weather for lack of an
operable autopilot unless the autopilot is required by the air-
craft minimum equipment list for the particular airplane.
so Id. at 742.
01 211 F. Supp. 91 (D. Md. 1962).
" Id. at 93.
I ld. at 98.
4 454 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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There was no such requirement for the aircraft in question. 6
The court struggled to uphold the FAA administrative deci-
sion because pilots are given the ultimate authority and re-
sponsibility to fly or not fly 66 and may base their decision on
weather factors. The court concluded, however, that a ration-
ality standard compelled it to uphold the FAA decision. 7
VI. PROBLEMS OF PROOF AND CAUSATION IN AUTOPILOT
LITIGATION
A. Proving Autopilot On Or Off
Reconstruction of the flight path of an airplane may indi-
cate whether the pilot used the autopilot at the time of the
crash. Even after a skilled investigator has examined the air
traffic controller/pilot communications, the FAA air traffic
control computer printouts (DART, D-logs, ITAP) of the
flight path, the available weather information, the pilot his-
tory, the aircraft maintenance history, and the wreckage, he
may still find it virtually impossible to determine whether the
autopilot was on or off at the time of the accident. Determin-
ing whether the autopilot had been used but disengaged or
overpowered by the pilot prior to the accident is also difficult.
Digital avionics and autopilot control switches that automati-
cally go off with the interruption of electrical power hardly
ever leave a trail of evidence in the wreckage to answer these
questions.
Some experts claim, however, to be able to determine the
position and mode selected by the pilot in an autopilot or
flight director from post-crash examination of the light fila-
ments in the annunciator panel. 8 Sometimes the pilot will ad-
vise air traffic control that he is operating with the autopilot
"I Id. at 1053-54. 14 C.F.R. § § 121.301-.369, 121.627(c) (1982). An autopilot is re-
quired equipment for certain Part 135 Flights if there is to be no co-pilot aboard. 14
C.F.R. § 135.105 (1982).
6 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1982).
454 F.2d at 1055.
e Address by Baker & Linquist, Lamp Examination for On or Off in Traffic Acci-
dents, Nw. U. Traffic Inst. (1976).
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engaged. Absent a survivor, the only other method to deter-
mine whether the autopilot was on at the time of the accident
is the testimony of the pilot's prior custom and practice, cou-
pled with expert opinion that may be sufficient to prove, by
circumstantial evidence, whether the autopilot was on or off.69
B. Problems Other Than the Autopilot
Another difficulty is determining whether the information
fed to the autopilot through the primary gyro-instruments is
faulty. When a gyro fails, the autopilot loses one of its pri-
mary sensors. For example, when the dry vacuum pump in
the single engine airplane fails, the artificial horizon and other
air-driven instruments also fail. The autopilot gets its infor-
mation from these sensors and feeds them to the computer.
Information from a failed artificial horizon renders the
autopilot useless even though the autopilot itself may be oper-
ating perfectly.
Furthermore, the autopilot's performance depends upon its
proper installation in the aircraft. If, for example, the control
cables are attached improperly or at the wrong tension, a
properly operating autopilot will not be able to fly the aircraft
as desired. Improper installation, therefore, may also cause
poor autopilot performance.
C. Severe Weather
Atmospheric conditions can cause an aircraft to deviate
from its intended flight path much more severely than any
autopilot malfunction. Wind shear70 and thunderstorms are
the most obvious examples of this kind of turbulence. Ice,
hail, wind gusts, freezing rain, and snow can also cause
problems for an aircraft beyond its design capability or
autopilot system. The aircraft flight manuals normally recom-
mend disengagement of the altitude-hold mode in turbulence.
Se. supra notes 45-48, 52-57, and accompanying text.
70 See Hardy, Windshear and Clear Air Turbulence, 42 J. AIR L. & COM 165
(1976).
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D. Human Factors
The pilot in command is directly responsible for the safe
operation of the aircraft,71 and the autopilot is only a second-
ary control system. Regarding human factors, numerous stud-
ies have been done in the field of instrument flying and spa-
tial disorientation.7 2 To the knowledge of these authors,
however, no studies have been published in the area of
whether an autopilot malfunction can cause spatial disorienta-
tion of the pilot. Likewise, there are no studies available to
support the FAA certification standard of a three second de-
lay (en route) or a one second delay (on approach) before ini-
tiation of recovery by the pilot from an autopilot malfunc-
tion.73 These are questions that should be answered in a
scientifically controlled environment, rather than through
autopilot litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1980's have already brought substantial advances in
autopilot technology. The Boeing 767 uses one autopilot to
monitor its other two autopilots, much like the systems used
in the Space Shuttle. The autopilot system in the Boeing 767
with autoland, has the capability to land at lower landing
minimums than the capabilities of most United States air-
ports. Even more interesting is the fact that the autopilot sys-
tems in some advanced aircraft can now bring an aircraft to a
decision height so low that if a go-around is necessary, the
capabilities of the aircraft in a landing configuration to do a
go-around from that altitude may be impossible.
For general aviation aircraft, the digital autopilot is the
autopilot of the 80's. It is now replacing the older analog com-
puter autopilots. With this new technology comes new safety
provisions. The new digital autopilots have mandatory self-
" 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1982).
See, e.g., Kraus, Disorientation in Flight, An Evaluation of the Etiological Fac-
tors, AEROSPACE MED., Sept. 1959, at 664; Zeller, Normand & Burke, Aircraft Acci-
dents and Aircraft Instruments, AEROSPACE MED., Jan. 1961, at 42.
73 FAA, ADVISORY CIR. No. 25.1329-IA, AUTOMATIC PILOT SYSTEMS APPROVAL (NON-
TRANSPORT) (1968).
AUTOPILOT LITIGATION
test requirements that must be satisfied before the autopilot
can be engaged. If the autopilot and all its circuitry are not
working properly, the autopilot will not turn on and will warn
the pilot. There are new servo monitors that read any hard
voltage and disengage the autopilot in order to prevent any
possibility of a "hard-over."
The air traffic control system of the United States will be
revolutionized in the next ten years by the wonders of elec-
tronics.7' Aircraft owners and operators can look forward to
Mode "S" transponders, microwave landing systems, and
computer-generated solutions to potential air conflicts. The
future for automatic pilots, transportation and general avia-
tion aircraft is a bright one. The litigation that unfortunately
results from advances in technology will require extra effort
on the part of lawyers and experts in order to be able to un-
derstand and explain these new systems.
' Allison, Automation in the Skies, HIGH TECH. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 40; Gar-
rison, Litegrated Flight-Control Systems, Automatic Navigation Systems and Fre-
quency-Management Systems, AvioNics NEws, SEPT. 1982, AT 24; SCHEF'rER, FAA's
Revolutionary Control System, POPULAR SCL, Oct. 1982, at 80.
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APPENDIX
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
ADAPTER CARD: A "card" or "circuit board" in a flight
computer. This card is designed to allow the functions of a
flight control system to be adapted to the specific require-
ments of a certain aircraft type.
AERODYNAMICS: That branch of science which deals
with the production of lift by the movement of a specially
shaped surface through the air.
AFT: To the rear, or toward the tail of the aircraft.
AILERON: A control surface near each wing tip. When the
aileron is deflected up, the wing will move down. When the
aileron is deflected down, the wing will move up. This causes
roll, or rotation about the longitudinal axis.
AIR SPEED INDICATOR: An aircraft instrument which
measures ram air pressure and indicates the speed of the air-
craft through the air. At lower altitudes, where air pressure
tends to be higher than above, the indicated air speed will be
greater than indicated at higher altitudes, even though the
airplane is moving at the same true air speed. At sea level,
indicated air speed and true airspeed are the same.
ALTIMETER: An aircraft instrument which measures air
pressure, and thus indicates the altitude at which an aircraft
is flying above a particular reference point.
ALTITUDE: Vertical elevation of an aircraft above a given
reference, normally expressed in terms of feet above mean sea
level.
ALTITUDE HOLD CARD: One of the "cards" or "circuit
boards" in a flight computer. This card governs the altitude-
holding capability of the autopilot.
ATTITUDE: The angular position of an aircraft deter-
mined with relationship to the earth's horizon.
AUTOMATIC PILOT (or AUTOPILOT): An automatic
flight control system which keeps an aircraft in level flight or
on a set course, as may be directed by the human pilot.
AUTOTRIM: The function of the autopilot which causes
automatic movement of the elevator trim tab, to compensate
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for forces upon the aircraft elevator without action by the
human pilot.
AVIONICS: Electronic equipment on board an aircraft.
AXIS: An imaginary straight line about which a body can
rotate. The lateral axis (also called the pitch axis) extends
through the aircraft wings, and the aircraft moves about the
lateral axis or pitch axis when the nose of the aircraft pitches
up or down. The longitudinal axis (also called the roll axis)
runs from the nose of the aircraft to the tail, and the aircraft
rotates about the longitudinal (or roll) axis when the aircraft
enters into a roll, one wing up and the other wing down. The
vertical axis extends vertically through the aircraft's center of
gravity. The aircraft rotates about the vertical axis (also called
the yaw axis) when the nose of the airplane moves to the left
or to the right.
CARD: In this case, this refers to a circuit board, or a small
plastic board containing a number of electrical circuits, which
is installed in the flight computer. In particular, the flight
computer contains an altitude hold card, an adapter card, and
a pitch card.
CENTER OF GRAVITY: Also referred to as "c.g." It is a
point within an aircraft at which all the weight is considered
to be concentrated.
CIRCUIT BOARD: A plastic board which contains a num-
ber of electrical circuits and which is installed in the flight
computer. Also referred to as a "card".
CONTROL COLUMN: The column or shaft in the aircraft
cockpit on which a control wheel is mounted. Rotating the
wheel causes movement of the ailerons and in-out movement
causes movement of the elevator.
CONTROL SURFACE: Normally refers to either one of the
ailerons, the elevator, or the rudder.
CONTROL WHEEL: Hand operated wheel in the cockpit
used to operate the elevator (by in-out movement) and aile-
rons (by rotating the wheel).
D-LOG: Data log or a computer printout of information se-
cured by FAA Air Traffic Control stations relating to the
flight history of aircraft in the area.
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DENSITY ALTITUDE: The altitude above mean sea level
under conditions of standard temperature and standard air
pressure which corresponds to the same air density and per-
formance characteristics for an aircraft which are actually ex-
perienced in nonstandard conditions at any particular
altitude.
ELEVATOR: A horizontal moveable control surface on the
tail of the airplane. In flight, when the elevator is deflected
up, the nose of the airplane tends to move up. Likewise, when
the elevator is moved or deflected down, the nose of the air-
craft will tend to move down.
EMPENNAGE: The rear portion or tail section of the
aircraft.
ENCODING ALTIMETER: A form of altimeter which is
interconnected to the transponder, and causes the transpon-
der to transmit different codes to indicate changes in altitude.
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration; the agency of the
federal government which establishes and enforces rules and
regulations relating to manufacture and operation of civil air-
craft, including those used in general aviation.
FAR: Federal Aviation Regulations, which are the rules,
regulations and guidelines established by the FAA for safety
and operation of civil aircraft.
FIN: The vertical portion of the tail, also known as the ver-
tical stabilizer, to which the rudder is connected.
FLIGHT COMPUTER: The flight computer is a small com-
puter on board the aircraft which is connected to the
autopilot and other systems of a flight control system.
FUSELAGE: The body of the aircraft, to which the wings,
tail, and landing gear are attached.
G-UNIT: A measure of acceleration force. A force of one
"g" is the force of gravity upon a body at rest. A net force of
zero "g's" causes weightlessness. A force of two "g's" is twice
the force of gravity upon a body at rest.
GENERAL AVIATION: That portion of the aviation in-
dustry other than military aviation or airlines.
HORIZONTAL STABILIZER: The horizontal portion of
the tail which does not move and to which the elevator is at-
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tached. Sometimes referred to in two parts as left horizontal
stabilizer and right horizontal stabilizer.
IFR: Instrument Flight Rules; the rules of the FAA for
flight by reference to instruments rather than outside visibil-
ity. These rules apply when the ceiling and/or visibility are
below certain minimums set by the FAA.
KNOT: One nautical mile per hour (approximately 1.15
statute miles per hour).
LATERAL AXIS: The axis of an aircraft which extends
through the center of gravity from wingtip to wingtip. Also
called the pitch axis.
LONGITUDINAL AXIS: The axis of an aircraft which ex-
tends through the fuselage from nose to tail, also called the
roll axis.
MANUAL/ELECTRIC TRIM: A function of a trim system,
by which a pilot moves a switch with his finger, sending an
electrical signal to the pitch trim servo to cause movement of
the trim tab when indicated.
MEAN SEA LEVEL: The average height of the surface of
the sea for all stages of tide; used as a reference for elevations
or altitudes throughout the United States.
MICROSWITCH: A small electric switch which is used to
open or close a circuit with a small amount of movement. A
microswitch is used on the primary pitch servo component to
send an electric signal to the pitch trim servo to cause move-
ment of the trim tab when indicated.
MODE CONTROLLER: This is a small panel containing a
number of buttons and switches which the pilot can engage to
use various functions of the flight control system.
NTSB: National Transportation Safety Board; the agency
of the federal government which is responsible for investigat-
ing aircraft accidents involving fatalities.
NAUTICAL MILE: A measure of distance used primarily
in navigation. A nautical mile equals 6,080 feet, or approxi-
mately 1.15 statute miles. Aircraft speeds are often expressed
in terms of "knots," which are nautical miles per hour.
PITCH: Rotation of the aircraft about its longitudinal axis.
When the aircraft pitches up, the nose of the aircraft goes up.
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When the aircraft pitches down, the nose of the aircraft goes
down.
PITCH CARD: One of the "cards" or "circuit boards" of
the flight computer which is part of the flight control system.
This card controls the pitch function of the autopilot.
PITCH TRIM SERVO: An electric motor which controls
the movement of the elevator trim tab.
PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION: Inspection of the aircraft
before takeoff to determine that all systems are functioning
properly for the intended flight.
PRIMARY PITCH SERVO: An electric motor which is part
of an autopilot system, and when engaged, will cause move-
ment of the aircraft elevator.
ROLL: The motion of the aircraft about the lateral axis,
controlled by the ailerons. When an aircraft rolls to the right,
the right wing drops and the left wing rises. When the aircraft
rolls to the left, the left wing drops and the right wing rises.
RUDDER: The movable vertical control surface attached to
the vertical stabilizer. Movement of the rudder causes the air-
craft to rotate about its vertical axis. When the rudder is
moved to the left, the nose of the airplane tends to move to
the left. When the rudder is moved to the right, the nose of
the aircraft tends to move to the right.
SERVO: An electric motor.
SOLENOID: A coil or wire with a movable core, which op-
erates as an electromagnet.
STABILIZERS: The non-movable portions of the tail, re-
ferred to as the vertical stabilizer, and the left or right hori-
zontal stabilizers.
STATUTE MILE: The distance commonly referred to as a
mile, being 5,280 feet.
STOP: In aviation, often refers to a device used to limit the
travel of a control surface. For example, the elevator stop lim-
its the amount of travel of the elevator up or down.
TAIL CONE: The rearmost part of an aircraft fuselage.
TRIM TAB: A small hinged portion of a movable control
surface that may be adjusted by the pilot in flight to a posi-
tion which will result in a balance of control forces. For exam-
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ple, the elevator trim tab is located on the elevator.
TRIM WHEEL: A small wheel located in the cockpit which
can be operated manually by the pilot to adjust the trim tab.
This trim wheel will also move by operation of the manual/
electric trim or automatic trim functions.
VA: Maneuvering speed. The maximum speed at which an
airplane's control surface can be fully deflected without struc-
tural damage.
VD: Designed diving speed. The maximum speed at which
an aircraft may safely execute a dive.
VNE: Never exceed speed. The speed beyond which an air-
craft should never be flown, also know as red line speed.
VERTICAL SPEED INDICATOR: Also known as the rate-
of-climb indicator. An aircraft instrument which measures air
pressure changes and indicates the rate of altitude change in
feet per minute (as either a climb or descent). For example, as
an aircraft descends, the altitude air pressure tends to in-
crease, and this instrument will show the rate of descent.
VERTICAL STABILIZER: The vertical portion of the tail
which does not move, also known as the fin, to which the rud-
der is attached.
VFR: Visual Flight Rules, the rules of the FAA which apply
to the operation of aircraft when instrument flight rules do
not apply.
WIND SHEAR: The rate of change of the direction or
speed of the wind over a given distance; conventionally ex-
pressed as vertical or horizontal wind shear.
YAW: Movement of the aircraft about the vertical axis.
When an aircraft yaws to the left, the nose moves to the left.
When an aircraft yaws to the right, the aircraft moves to the
right.
1983]

